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1. Introduction
This article aims at conceptualising, in analytical as well
as normative-theoretical terms, the tensions between
free trade, democratic and social standards, and na-
tional sovereignty that are named in the “globalisation
trilemma” (Rodrik, 2011) for the case of the European
Union (EU). I argue that the trilemma concept is much
more fitting to the EU than a simple trade-off concept,
as it offers a conceptual path to both analysing existing
tensions and thinking of resolving them.
European integration has had a negative impact on
democratic and social standards in the member states
because: a) the EU has been intervening into national
democracies and national sovereignty as its legislation
is superior to national legislation; b) EU legislation and
judgements of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) have
been reducing national social standards; and c) execu-
tives and numerous new institutions and agencies with
indirect legitimation have taken over competencies that
formerly lay in the domain of national directly legitimated
legislatives (see Grimm, 2017; Scharpf, 1999; Wiesner,
2019). As will be discussed below, d) these negative ef-
fects relate to the EU’s giving preference to the liberal-
isation of free trade of capital, goods and services over
democracy, social standards, and national sovereignty.
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In the current discussion on the EU’s impact on
democracy and social standards, several contributions
(see Section 2) argue that the EU endangers national
democracy and national social standards. I share this crit-
ical diagnosis. There is, however, one part in these argu-
ments that I do not share: they assume a trade-off be-
tween either an ongoing integration and trade liberalisa-
tion in the EU, or an upkeeping of democratic and social
standards. In this article, I argue in favour of analysing
trade liberalisation, democracy, and high social stan-
dards as a trilemma instead. The trilemma conception
fits better with the complexity of the tensions at stake,
and furthermore it offers a conceptual path to resolving
them. This approach offers both an alternative perspec-
tive and a conceptual path to thinking about solutions.
The second section of this article analyses the EU’s
negative impact on democratic and social standards.
Against the framework of the globalisation trilemma,
I will analyse these tensions. The analysiswill be followed
by normative-theoretical judgements on the quality of
democracy of the setting that has been found. The third
section discusses why the tensions described should be
conceptualised as a trilemma rather than a trade-off. The
fourth section evaluates the state of the art of demo-
cratic and social standards in the EU. Finally, the fifth
section develops the perspectives of following a path to-
wards upkeeping high democratic and social standards in
the EU at the expense of national sovereignty.
2. Globalised Capitalism, the Globalisation Trilemma,
and the EU: Conceptual Reflection and Analysis
Over the last years, the academic debate has started to
focus on the question whether democracy is compatible
with globalised and financialised capitalism. Several au-
thors agree that the dominance of a market-oriented fi-
nancialised form of capitalism threatens representative
democracy in its substance, with several contributions
criticising the EU in this respect (e.g., Menéndez, 2015;
Merkel, 2014; Somek, 2015; Streeck, 2014; Wiesner,
2016). The critical view on global financialised capital-
ism and its effects for democracy is in fit with Dani
Rodrik’s (2011) analysis. He states, first, that successful
economies depend on successful democratic institutions:
“Markets and governments are complements, not substi-
tutes. If you want more and better markets, you have to
have more (and better) governance. Markets work best
not where the states are the weakest but where they are
strong” (Rodrik, 2011, p. xviii).
This leads Rodrik (2011) to argue not only in favour of
keeping good government, but also in favour of accept-
ing that there is not only one path to economic prosper-
ity, i.e., the path of trade deregulation. On the contrary:
Using several examples, he demonstrates how in the
case of many countries it was precisely economic inter-
vention and regulation that led the path to economic suc-
cess (Rodrik, 2011, pp. 135–158). The discussion leads
Rodrik to present the conceptual framework of the:
Political trilemma of the world economy: We can-
not simultaneously pursue democracy, national de-
termination, and economic globalisation. If we want
to push globalisation further, we have to give up ei-
ther the nation state or democratic politics. If we
want to maintain and deepen democracy, we have
to choose between the nation state and international
economic integration. And if we want to keep the na-
tion state and self-determination, we have to choose
between deepening democracy and deepening glob-
alisation. Our troubles have their roots in our reluc-
tance to face up these ineluctable choices. (Rodrik,
2011, pp. xviii–xix)
Rodrik, however, does not explicitly discuss the EU in
his book. So why, as has been argued above, is the EU
in fit with the argument of the globalisation trilemma
(on the following see also Wiesner, 2016, 2017b, 2019)?
The argument that out of three decisive political goals—
free trade, national sovereignty and national social se-
curity, and democracy—only two can be combined in a
satisfactory manner explains the EU’s current problems
very well.
EU integration, as will be discussed in more detail
throughout this article, has been strongly based on an in-
tensification of free trade via creation of an internal mar-
ket and the abolition of market barriers. As has been said
above, this entailed a cutting down of national social and
democratic standards.When conceptually applied to the
EU, the trilemma entails not just one, but three trade-
offs. The EU has to decide between having or keeping
either: 1) national sovereignty, national social security,
and free trade, i.e., cutting down democracy; 2) national
sovereignty, national social security, and democracy, i.e.,
limiting free trade; or 3) free trade and democracy, i.e.,
cutting down national sovereignty. One cannot have all
three of these at a time.
My argument is now that this trilemma not only de-
scribes a setting of three different trade-offs in the EU,
it also allows to conceptualise a solution to an ongoing
reduction of democratic and social standards via EU eco-
nomic integration. I will, in the course of my argument,
detail the conditions for reconciling democracy, social
standards, and free trade in the EU: The EU needs to
compensate for the losses of democratic and social stan-
dards on the national level. It then can become an exam-
ple of free trade between nation-states not being a nui-
sance to democracy and social standards. But the path
that combines internal free trade in the EU with keep-
ing up high democratic and social standards leads to a re-
duction of national sovereignty, the third dimension of
the trilemma.
In the following sections, I will describe how the re-
alisation of the EU’s liberal market rights collided with
social and democratic standards in the member states.
Two empirical examples shall be briefly sketched: a) a
possible trade-off between trade liberalisation and so-
cial standards (Section 2.1); and b) a possible trade-off
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between financial liberalisation and national democracy
(Section 2.2).
2.1. A Trade-Off between Trade Liberalisation and
National Social Standards?
As has been said, European integration has been related
to economic deregulation and trade liberalisation. The
EU is based on the so-called four freedoms, i.e., free cir-
culation of goods, people, services, and capital in the
EU’s inner market. After decades of market integration,
these four freedoms today are realised. The CJEU (for-
merly European Court of Justice [ECJ]) played a decisive
part in interpreting these principles and thus shaping le-
gal and political practice. In its important judgements
which were decisive for establishing legal and political
standards in applying EU law, the Court mostly judged
in favour of free trade—and often against national so-
cial standards (Grimm, 2017; Scharpf, 1999). What was
tellingly termed “negative integration” by Fritz Scharpf
(1999) thus affected national social standards. With this
concept, Scharpf wants to emphasize that market cre-
ation in the EU, much more than on the creation of new
rules and common standards (“positive integration”),
was based on what he terms “negative integration,” i.e.,
the abolition or reduction of national social standards be-
cause they were considered as obstacles to market inte-
gration (Scharpf, 1999).
Two judgements of the Court are illustrative for the
effect of negative integration on social rights. The posted
workers directive (EU, 2006) rules the conditions for
workers that are posted into EU member states other
than their home countries. The cases Rüffert and Laval re-
ferred to the working conditions in the state the workers
were posted into, and also the right of trade unions to be
protesting. In its judgements, the Court tried to interpret
both these rights as narrow as possible, arguing explicitly
that the postedworkers directive was definingmaximum
rather than minimum standards. Member states receiv-
ing posted workers thus could claim the posting compa-
nies only to keep the standards defined in the directive,
but not more.
In the Rüffert case (Dirk Rüffert v. Land
Niedersachsen, 2008), the Court judged that the German
federal state of Lower Saxony could not take action
against a German company that did not pay agreed
wages to the workers employed by a Polish subcontrac-
tor. In the Laval case (Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 2007), the Court even de-
cided that national trade unions could only protest or
get on strike against companies that were not resident in
the respective member states in the few cases touched
upon by the posted workers directive. In all other cases,
legal action or strike against companies that sidetrack
national social standards are excluded.
In these cases, the effects of European integration
and trade liberalisation laws visibly worked along the
lines of the globalisation trilemma, emphasising trade
liberalisation in the EU at the expense of national
sovereignty and national social standards. But, and this is
a normative judgement, social rights are an elementary
prerequisite of democracy (see in detail Wiesner, 2012,
2019, pp. 249-260) as social inequality hinders equal
democratic participation and representation. Reducing
social rights thusmust be judged critically for its negative
effects on equality and, ultimately, democracy.
Related to such arguments, one of the most critical
accounts on the EU by Wolfgang Streeck (2014, 2015) es-
tablishes a clear and causal link between a decrease of
welfare standards and democratic substance in the EU’s
member states andderegulation by the EU. Streeck (2014,
2015) therefore concludes that national sovereignty, na-
tional welfare states, and national democracies must be
restored. In his view, capitalism should be de-globalised,
and embedded democracy restored by re-embedding
capitalism on the national level, which would also entail
cutting down the EU (Streeck, 2015, pp. 59–60).
2.2. A Trade-Off between the Effects of Financial
Liberalisation and National Democracy?
Second, andmore recently, European integration has led
to deteriorating or circumventing national democratic in-
stitutions, especially during the financial crisis and re-
garding the new institutions that have been set up. A sys-
tem of supervision and new bodies developed, deci-
sively cutting down competencies of national legislatives.
Moreover, the new institutions make it difficult to deter-
mine who is to be held accountable for budgetary de-
cisions and austerity. All this brought about numerous
challenges for representative democracy in the EU mul-
tilevel system (e.g., Bellamy &Weale, 2015; Crum, 2013;
Laffan, 2016; Majone, 2014; Sanchez-Cuenca, 2017; on
the following see also Wiesner, 2016, 2017b, 2019).
Depending on which level is concerned (EU or mem-
ber states), which kind of measure and instrument
(European Stability Mechanism [ESM], Six-pack, Two-
pack) and which status the respective state has (debtor
or creditor), the effects of crisis governance on rep-
resentative democracy vary (e.g., Fischer, 2016; Jančić,
2016; Maatsch, 2017). First, there are measures that
fall under the regime of the Lisbon Treaty and have
been voted upon with the participation of the European
Parliament (EP), such as the Six-pack and Two-pack mea-
sures. Second, other measures are excluded from the
treaty framework, such as the ESM. It is based on a
new intergovernmental treaty and hence falls outside
the official realm of the Lisbon Treaty and the checks and
balances it establishes. Third, implementation of finan-
cial aid legislation has led to governmental attempts to
strengthen executive dominance inmanymember states,
for instance by using fast-track procedures in decision-
making (Maatsch, 2017). The two latter points have led
to serious consequences for representative democracy in
the member states concerned. The case of financial aid
governance is most pertinent here.
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In order to understand and analyse the setting of fi-
nancial aid, one player is crucial: Article 137 of the Treaty
on Functioning of the EU (TFEU) states that the 19 Euro
states constitute the “Euro Group.” It is closely related to
both the Council of the European Union (Council in this
text) and the European Council1, as the respective minis-
ters of finance belong to the Council, and the respective
heads of state and government to the European Council.
But, as Protocol No. 14 of the Lisbon Treaty states, Euro
Group meetings are informal (EU, 2016). This leads to a
decisive difference in transparency: While Council meet-
ings are public when the Council is acting in its legislative
function, this is not the case for the Euro Group.
The ESM, which officially started on October 8th,
2012, is also related to the Euro Group. As the German
Ministry of Finance explains, it is an intergovernmental fi-
nancial institution and therefore subject to international
law (Bundesfinanzministerium, 2017). Governance of fi-
nancial aid has in large parts been concretely operated
by the often cited “Troika,” consisting of representa-
tives of Commission, European Central Bank (ECB), and
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Formally, the Troika
is their agent and is charged with: a) negotiating the
conditions of financial aid; and b) controlling that these
conditions are kept. The ministers of finance and eco-
nomics of the Euro states decide on financial aid and its
conditions (European Council, 2012, Art. 5)—after the
Troika has negotiated these conditions and fixed them in
a “Memorandum of Understanding” (MoU). This MoU is
signed by representants of the Commission in the name
of the ESM (European Council, 2012, Art. 13, 3).
This means that the Troika not only is the agent that
controls all conditions linked to any financial assistance,
it is also in charge of negotiating these terms and putting
them down in MoU. The Troika, accordingly, has a high
degree of independence and considerable hard power—
while it shows a low degree of accountability and trans-
parency. The ESM Treaty defines the members and the
general tasks of the Troika, but neither sets limits for its
competencies nor establishes standards for its account-
ability. In particular, it remains unclear which competen-
cies the Troika has over the member states, their govern-
ments, and their parliaments, how those competences
refer to the Troika’s principals, ECB, Commission, and IMF,
and how they relate to the Euro Group’s governments.
It might be argued that such undefined competencies
are an outcome of “incomplete contracting” as part of
a principal-agent relation. Nevertheless, the structure is
so opaque that it is difficult to see how the principals con-
trol the agent in the end.
But as the Troika negotiated the MoU, it de facto set
the conditions for the national budgets. Accordingly, the
most decisive change in the debtor states is to be seen in
the fact that key standards of representative democracy
are not followed anymore and decision-making powers
in the budget procedurewere handed over from the bod-
ies that have been directly legitimised by the sovereign
(national parliaments and governments) to bodies that
either are only indirectly legitimised, such as the Euro
Group, international non-majoritarian bodies, such as
the IMF, or expert groups such as the Troika. But bud-
getary right is, for good reasons, understood as one of
the crown jewels of a parliament: a budget symbolically
and materially expresses the will of the parliamentary
majority by defining the policies to be carried out in a
country. A parliament that, in the end, cannot decide
on details and between true alternatives regarding the
budget, has lost the core of its role as a parliament.
Decisions, then, not only are de-politicised, but also void
of the substance of parliamentarism. In such cases, par-
liament takes on a referendum role (voting just Yes or No)
rather than the parliamentary function of deliberation
and vote. This also reduces the role and weight of the in-
put legitimation once given by the sovereign in domestic
elections: the legitimised national parliaments and gov-
ernments whose decision-making powers have been cut
down in substance (see in detail Wiesner, 2019).
This means that all crisis governance institutions
brought a power shift from legislatives to executives
and experts, both in the EU and in the member states.
The financial aid part of crisis governance severely im-
pedes national representative democracies and their bal-
ances of powers in the EU’smultilevel system. In addition,
the new intergovernmental institutions bypass the pro-
gresses to supranational representative democracy ob-
tained in the EU over the last decades by excluding the
EP. It is a decisive legitimisation problem to have shifted
decisive parts of the decision-making competencies both
outside the EU’s and most of the national representa-
tive institutions.
Again, this scenario fits into the globalisation
trilemma: The liberalisation of financialmarkets together
with monetary integration first led to a crisis, and the
attempts to remedy that crisis ultimately led to reduc-
ing national democratic standards. A number of recent
contributions have underlined these problem fields. For
instance, a special issue of the European Law Journal
discusses financial crisis governance and its effects on
democracy in terms of German constitutional lawyer
Herman Heller’s concept of authoritarian liberalism.
Heller had, in a 1932 essay, linked upcoming authori-
tarianism to economic liberalism (Heller, 2015). In his
discussion of Heller’s essay, Alexander Somek speaks of
a move towards authoritarian liberalism in the EU:
First, what emerges is a clear drive towards the cen-
tralisation of power. The autonomy of Member States
to decide their fiscal and economic policies has been
drastically curtailed….Second, the Eurozone has be-
come equipped with the means to extend credit to
1 The Treaty on European Union distinguishes the Council of the European Union, i.e., the Council of Ministers, and the European Council, i.e., the body
representing the heads of state and government (European Union, 2016). When I mention the Council in the following, I refer to the Council of the
European Union. The European Council is named as such.
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its Member States through the European Stability
Mechanism….The granting of aid is closely tied to the
so-called ‘economic conditionality’….The conditional-
ity is supposed to ensure that states are capable of sus-
taining the ‘stability’ of financial markets, which must
not be upset by the state not back paying on either
interest or principal debt. (Somek, 2015, p. 341)
Others have argued in a similar vein that the EU, espe-
cially in what I have termed its “crisis mode” (Wiesner,
2019), is in a state of emergency (Maatsch & Cooper,
2017; White, 2015; see in detail Wiesner, 2019). In a
slightly less dramatical tone, Claus Offe has highlighted
that the crisis emphasised a discrepancy between exec-
utive dominance and governance of crisis measures and
decreasing citizen support for the EU (Offe, 2015).
3. Trilemma, Not Trade-Offs
Returning to the conceptual questions, in this section
I will further argue why the possible trade-offs sketched
should, rather than as either-or constellations, be con-
ceptualised as part of a trilemma. This is mainly because
they are not unresolvable, but can be settled by mak-
ing choices. If the EU sets up new democratic and so-
cial standards at the EU level and hence cuts down na-
tional sovereignty some more, it can keep up its high
level of trade integration. To underline my argument,
I will start by an analysis of the political and legal pro-
cesses that have shaped the fields of conflict that have
been sketched.
3.1. Why Does the EU Challenge Democratic and
Social Standards?
Why did European integration lead to the outcome that
was sketched? A first explanation is to be seen in the EU’s
historical origins. European integration started with the
goals to create a balance of powers in Europe, to central-
ize control over the core industries of coal and steel, and
to tameWesternGermany. Economic integrationwas the
tool for this, so the creation of an inner market for the
first three decades of integration has been at the core of
the integration process (Wiesner, 2014). Accordingly, the
EU Treaties, i.e., the European Coal and Steel Community,
the European Economic Community (EEC), and Euratom
treaties and the ones that followed them, make a strong
point of abolishing all obstacles to a free market econ-
omy and a successful inner market in the EU (or for-
mer EEC). Thus, the EU Treaties helped pave, and still
do so, the way for market liberalisation, putting down
all possible barriers to free trade, and even national so-
cial standards.
Besides the Treaties, a second decisive part was
played by their interpreters, namely the Commission and
the Court. Dieter Grimm (2017) knowingly describes the
role of the latter, pointing out decisive factors. First, the
Court acted as an agent of integration and deregulation.
Second, this limited the possibilities of member state
governments to successfully shape and correct EU sec-
ondary law. Third, the EU Treaties as EU primary law reg-
ulate policy fields that normally should be subject to sec-
ondary law. Fourth, the Court became a major player in
integration via its own judgements.
In two judgements in 1963 and 1964, the ECJ had
claimed EU law to be superior to nation-state law, amove
that has been interpreted as a constitutionalisation of
the Treaties. But, different from national constitutions,
the Treaties regulate a number of fields and issues that in
a nation-statewould belong to the field of secondary law,
and, namely, economic policy rules. Decisive economic
policy rules thus being of constitution-like character, it
was not the legislative, but the judicative in the sense
of the ECJ that had the strongest power to interpret
them. In many cases, the ECJ decided in favour of abol-
ishing obstacles to the inner market—even in the shape
of national social standards. The ECJ therefore pushed
negative integration in the sense of putting down mar-
ket obstacles without creating new regulations. This is
why Grimm (2017) judges the Court to follow a political
agenda in favour of deregulation.
But the former ECJ was not alone in putting forward
economic deregulation in the EU. The Treaties set the
framework, but the Commission issued the respective
law initiatives. Moreover, often enough, the EU legisla-
tors, i.e., member state governments and the EP, voted
in favour of deregulation laws. But why?
The simplest explanation is policy preferences. From
the 1970s onwards and, in particular, after the end of the
social democrat era, governments deciding in the Council
were increasingly led by conservatives and/or liberals,
and economic policy was shaped by liberal market orien-
tations. Governments not only shaped their national eco-
nomic policies, but also deregulation policies in the EUvia
their votes in the Council. Discrepancies between richer
and poorer EU member states favoured this: Negative in-
tegration is wished for by both rich and poor countries,
as it facilitates market access and trade. Positive inte-
gration, that is, raising new standards, is not wished for
by the poorer states, as they tend to profit from social
dumping and a race to the bottom (Hix & Høyland, 2011,
pp. 209–215). The dynamics in the Council have become
evenmore pertinent in the crisis as findings state that the
Council became a more important decision-making fo-
rum alongside other intergovernmental institutions such
as the Eurogroup (Fabbrini & Puetter, 2016).
Since legislative co-decision between EP and Council
has been introduced in Maastricht, the EP regularly co-
decided on the new inner market laws. Liberals and
Conservatives were a decisive force in the EP as well,
and often in the majority. The EP therefore could not
present a serious obstacle to the deregulation agenda led
by Commission, Council and ECJ. On the contrary: the EP
approved of several of the new EU deregulation laws.
Another additional reason behind the decision-
making of Council and EP is a self-binding, at first of the
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governments, but then also the EP majority, to the rules
of the financial markets. AsWolfgang Streeck sketches in
detail, the new common currency in the 1990s was pre-
pared not by an economic government, but by a control
of the criteria of convergence (Streeck, 2014, pp. 97–164)
which have been anticipating today’s austerity regime.
Most member states, Commission, and EP in their ma-
jorities supported this self-binding to the markets from
the 1990s onwards.
All this, first, is in fit with the economic Zeitgeist in
favour of deregulation in the 1990s and 2000s that has
been at length described by Dani Rodrik (2011) as one
reason for the dominant directions in economic policies
of the time. Second, it means that a complex setting of
actors, interests, strategies, and political decisions led to
economic deregulation in the EU. Besides the Court as
a major driving force, Commission, member state gov-
ernments, and also the EP have been deciding and co-
deciding in favour of deregulation—either because it was
in their political interests, or because of a self-binding to
financial austerity. The decrease of democratic and so-
cial standards that has been described above is a conse-
quence of these policies. Third, there is political action
and representative-democratic decision-making behind
deregulation, and this means that it is possible that the
actors in question decide and act otherwise.
4. Democracy and Social Standards on the EU Level:
State of the Art
So far, I have discussed and conceptualised whether
and to what extent the EU is entrapped in a trilemma.
I have argued above that there are some crucial ten-
sions between deregulation, trade liberalisation, social
standards, and democracy to be noticed in the EU, but
that none of these is an unresolvable or definite trade-
off. They rather have to be seen as part of a trilemma
that allows for policy choices in favour of democratic
and social standards. As a first conclusion, then, I ar-
gue that the globalisation trilemma presents a valuable
framework for conceptualising and analysing tensions
between trade liberalisation, national sovereignty, social
standards, and democracy present in the EU.
On this basis, in this section I will argue in favour of
the possible path to reconcile integration, a certain level
of free trade, and democratic and social standards. We
can aim for restoring democracy and social rights at the
EU level itself and hence re-regulate free trade and its ef-
fects. But, and again, this is in fit with the globalisation
trilemma, such a reconciliation would require resolving
the trilemma at the expense of national sovereignty be-
cause the democratic procedures and the means of reg-
ulation of the EU level would need to be strengthened.
This loss of national sovereignty of the member states
would be linked to strengthening the EU as another level
of democracy, social protection, and regulation. What
are the perspectives for such a solution? Or has it already
been partly achieved? What is hence the state of the art
concerning democracy in the EU? And what about social
standards? Analysis shows that there have been consid-
erable achievements in these respects, but they are in-
complete. Accordingly, if the loss of national democratic
and social substance is to be compensated in the EU, the
EU needs to be better democratised and social standards
need to be better protected.
In short, the problems are decisively linked to an
accumulation of seven problem fields (on the follow-
ing see in detail Wiesner, 2019, pp. 281–301) that can
be related to the globalisation trilemma’s tensions that
have been described. The problem fields that are most
pertinent for the democratic deficits are: 1) an over-
bureaucratisation; 2) expert dominance; and 3) an over-
constitutionalisation—these three reduce horizontal and
vertical accountability and limit the space for political
and public deliberation on politics and policies. The
problem fields that impede social standards are: 4) dif-
ferentiated integration; and 5) the effects of negative
integration—these two cut down national democratic
and social standards without creating them anew on the
EU level. Two more problem fields relate to the EU’s ori-
gin as an intergovernmental organisation and question
whether national sovereignty in the EU should be fur-
ther cut down. They are: 6) the lack of an idea and a
practice of the EU common good; and 7) a weakly devel-
oped demos.
4.1. Democratic Standards and Deficits in the EU
The first three problem fields limit the quality of democ-
racy in the EU:
1) Over-bureaucratisation: consensus-building and
bureaucracy dominate in decision-making pro-
cesses in the EU (see in detail Tömmel, 2014), at
the expense of democratic deliberation and public-
ity. Processes such as trilogues (pre-negotiations
between EP and Council representants that lead
to most legal projects in the EU being accepted
upon first readings) largely take place behind
closed doors and in expert circles. Trilogues do not
withdraw decisions from parliamentary decision-
making as such. In trilogues, parliamentary com-
mittees and also the plenary are involved from
the beginning to the end. The problem is one
of weights and substance: if the most decisive
part of the legislative process is carried out be-
hind closed doors by experts in non-transparent
negotiation circles, democratic accountability is
reduced even if in the end parliament and its
committees are involved just as they should
be formally and legally (Reh, 2014; Roederer-
Rynning & Greenwood, 2015, 2017). Trilogues de-
democratise and de-politicize decision-making in
the EU.
2) A number of expert bodies that have been created
over the years possess executive competencies,
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and they are also largelywithdrawnanddecoupled
from the realm of public representative decision-
making. The EU’s agencies, as well as private con-
sultancy firms that dowork for the Commission are
examples here, but also the Troika (see in detail
Wiesner, 2019, pp. 237–248).
3) Over-constitutionalisation: This problem is further
emphasised by the Treaties themselves limiting
the possible realm for democratic deliberation
and decision-making. As described above, they fix
decisive parts of the EU’s economic governance
with a quasi-constitutional character (see in detail
Grimm, 2017), whereas in most national represen-
tative democracies, economic policymaking is sub-
ject to simple legislation.
The problem cluster of expert dominance, bureaucracy,
and over-constitutionalisation in sum limits the realm
for public deliberation and politicised decision-making.
It limits accountability in both horizontal and vertical
direction, and it limits transparency. But these prob-
lems could be reduced by just filling the democratic
bodies that there are with active life. Concretely, the
EP should use its co-decision powers to the fullest ex-
tent possible and shift the substantial weight of par-
liamentary debates and decisions back into the parlia-
mentary and public bodies and arenas, away from tri-
logues. This would also increase the EP’s horizontal ac-
countability and legitimacy as well as its responsiveness.
Furthermore, decision-making competencies should be
taken away from indirectly legitimised agents such as the
Troika: Decisions should be discussed and taken by the
bodies that are directly legitimised for this, and that are
directly accountable.
More room for democratic deliberation is possible
and needed on the EU level and in themulti-level system.
A broad solution here would be to de-constitutionalise
the EU and to turn a large part of the EU’s primary law
into secondary law, in order for economic policy goals—
which currently are largely fixed by the Treaties—to
be made subject to political debate and representative-
democratic politicised decision-making. But this change
would depend on a major treaty change and again re-
quire unanimity of the member state governments, and
in the EU’s current situation it seems highly unlikely it
could be obtained, especially as not all the member
states governments (and Germany first in rank) would
subscribe to the goal to politicize and democratize eco-
nomic policymaking in the EU.
Nevertheless, a number of policy areas already are
potentially subject to political and controversial deliber-
ation and decision-making, both on the EU and on the
national level. But the non-transparent decision-making
structures and preferences of national governments that
have been discussed above hinder open debate in many
cases. Why shouldn’t, for instance, austerity policies be
debated in the Euro Group member states, in a simi-
lar vein as national pension scheme reforms? And why
shouldn’t debates about EP decisions on the budget be
subject to EU wide political discussion? Similarly, it can
be asked why Council and EC do not have more contro-
versial and also more public political debates—at least
the Council has a number or parliamentary functions
(Palonen & Wiesner, 2016) that could be more open to
the public, just as in other parliaments.
4.2. What Impedes Social Standards?
The two next problem clusters both lead to downgrad-
ing national social standards and impede setting up new
EU-wide social standards:
4) Differentiated integration: Different degrees of in-
tegration in different policy areas, and among dif-
ferent groups of member states, disperse the EU
into a great variety of different regulation regimes
and schemes. These range from co-decision in the
inner market over the intergovernmentally struc-
tured Common Foreign and Security Policy, the
Euro Group that just unites the Euro-Countries,
to the Schengen System. This dispersion of gover-
nance modes in a polity as big as the EU does not
simply create differing patterns of legitimisation
and control: if it is unclear, even to experts, who
has taken a decision and what way the decision-
making process went, democratic accountability
and transparency are also clearly hampered.
5) Negative integration: As said above, the EU neg-
ative integration (i.e., the abolition of market-
hindering regulations) dominates over positive
integration (i.e., re-regulation; Scharpf, 1999).
Negative integration has cut down national demo-
cratic standards and achievements such as so-
cial citizenship rights (see in detail Wiesner, 2019,
pp. 249–260). Moreover, there has not been a
compensation on the EU level. EU-related citi-
zenship rights are mainly market-related freedom
rights, with the addition of a core set of politi-
cal rights linked to Union Citizenship. Social rights
have rarely been defined on the EU level so far. As
has been explained above, besides a harmonisa-
tion of some basic social standards, positive inte-
gration in the sense of setting up new EU related
social rights has been difficult to obtain because of
diverging interests of the member states.
The effects of both differentiated integration and neg-
ative integration need to be limited, especially when it
comes to achievements that are crucial for democratic
standards. In brief (for detailed discussions see Wiesner,
2017a, 2017b) there are two possible ways that refer to
either upkeeping the trilemma and its tensions, or to re-
solving it at the expense of national sovereignty:
a) There is a narrow solution: In policy areas ruled
by the EU, democratic and social standards in the
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member states must be protected and negative in-
tegration hindered. This could, for instance, hap-
pen via EU laws that exclude any intervention into
national democratic and social standards even in
times of financial aid. If theMoU, for instance, only
fixed the sums to be cut in the budgets rather than
the related policies as well, national parliaments
would keep much more decision-making powers.
This solution, nota bene, is a defensive one because fol-
lowing the argument above, national democratic stan-
dards are in permanent latent tension with free trade in
the EU, and this permanent tension can only be resolved
if they are ultimately transferred to the EU. As long as
this is not the case—mainly because of the reasons dis-
cussed in the concluding section—it is an interim pro-
tection mechanism to keep up national standards. The
trilemma in this scenario is kept.
b) In the broad solution, new democratic and social
standards would be created at the EU level as the
EU would be fully integrated, national sovereignty
would be decisively cut down, and the trilemma
would be resolved into one direction. The EU
would then decide or co-decide in all, or almost
all, of the policies that are currently ruled by demo-
cratic nation-states. This would stop differentiated
integration and submit all policy areas to one
mode of legitimation, but it would require a num-
ber of changes that are neither realist nor work-
able in the moment, such as EU taxes to finance
EU redistribution and common social standards
to safeguard one and the same level of protec-
tion everywhere.
5. The EU’s Common Good versus National Sovereignty
I have argued that, in order to resolve the tensions be-
tween trade liberalisation and deregulation on one hand
and democratic and social standards in the EU on the
other, it is necessary to strengthen democratic and so-
cial standards on the EU level. This claim immediately
leads to the third trilemma dimension, the one of na-
tional sovereignty. As argued above, it is a consequence
that it needs to be cut down somewhat further.
As long as this is not the case, an inbuilt tension in-
herent to the EU will have its way that relates to the last
two problem clusters at stake. As intergovernmental and
supranational dynamics coexist and are represented in
the EU’s institutions, these are only partly led by an ori-
entation towards an EU common good, and they are only
weakly related to an EU demos:
6) The EU’s common good: The EU’s supranational
bodies—the EP and the Commission—are ori-
ented towards the EU’s common good, while
the intergovernmental bodies—the Council of the
European Union and the European Council—are
oriented towards the national particular inter-
ests (see in detail Tömmel, 2014, pp. 324–330).
Moreover, while national governments work in a
short-term logic as they want to be re-elected, EU
institutions aremuchmore independent fromelec-
toral choices (see in detail Hix & Høyland, 2011).
This situation creates a tension and a tendency in
the EU’s system that in a very general way hin-
ders an overall orientation to an EU common good.
Such an orientation, however, should be a basic
principle of all institutions of a democratic polity.
So far, there is not only a weak level of institutional
orientation towards an EU common good, there
is also no agreement what this common good is
about. Should the EU just continue to create an in-
ner market, as it did? Or should it become a truly
supranational federation?
7) These questions lead to asking how the distance
between EU citizens and elites can be reduced, and
how the EU citizenry could turn into a stronger
demos, i.e., a real and active democratic subject.
It is immediately evident that these two last problemclus-
ters directly relate to national sovereignty and the ques-
tions to what extent a common good can be suprana-
tional rather than national, and in what respect a demos
can be EU-related rather than nation-state-oriented. One
answer given in the academic debate is that the EU
must continue not as democracy, but as demoi-cracy,
i.e., as an organisation that continues to be based on
the democratic input legitimacy of the member states
national demoi (see, e.g., Cheneval & Schimmelfennig,
2013; Nicolaïdis, 2013). My argument is obviously—and
for a number of reasons—opposed to this view.
As I have argued above, the tensions between
democracy, free trade, and social standards in the EU
must be seen in their interrelations in the multi-level sys-
tem between the EU and its member states. If one sticks
only to the nation-states and their demoi as resource of
legitimation, the tensions inflicted by trade liberalisation
in the EU remain unchanged and will continue to chal-
lenge democratic and social standards. As I have argued,
the only way to resolve the trilemmawithout reducing ei-
ther democratic or social standards—or without cutting
down economic EU integration—is to strengthen demo-
cratic standards at EU level and to keep social standards
intact, or even better, set them up at EU level as well.
If the member states agreed to this, to protect and
create new democratic and social standards, in principle
the EU could use the same means that helped to embed
capitalism in the nation-state context: laws that regulate
trade and protect democracy, accompanied by political
debates and representative democratic decision-making
on the goals of economic policy. But, as said, this would
require treaty changes (making economic policy subject
to secondary legislation) and hence unanimity between
the EU’s governments in the Council, and this prospect
does not seem realist at the moment.
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As long as such a thorough treaty change is not to be
obtained, an interim solution is a compromise. The ten-
sions of the trilemma can be soothed via a mix of differ-
ent measures and steps that combine mechanisms that
strengthen democracy in the EU and help re-regulate the
effects of negative integration, without completely play-
ing down the role of the national democratic systems,
and while upkeeping their democratic standards. In ad-
dition, protection mechanisms in the multi-level system
are needed which safeguard what social standards have
been achieved. But, to conclude, it needs to be under-
lined that the tensions described by the trilemma con-
ception are impossible to be completely resolved. If no
clear option in the trilemma can be achieved, it can only
be hedged in a probably permanently instable way.
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